From the director…
This month has a strong New
Zealand focus as we examine several regulatory determinations and some policy
decisions. We then take a quick look at the M&A activity in Europe,
Australia and New Zealand, and that’s pretty much it for this month.
Hopefully many of us will be able
to catch up at the EEA Conference later this week.
About Utility Consultants
Utility Consultants Ltd is a
management consultancy specialising in the following aspects of energy and
infrastructure networks…
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recent projects, pick
this link.
NZ – matters requiring attention
Revised Government Policy Statement on Electricity
The Minister of Energy signed off
the latest GPS in mid-May 2008. Refer to the fill article below under the
Energy Policy section.
Review of s62 of the Electricity Act
The provision for cessation of
supply post-2013 as set out in s62 of the Electricity Act 1992 has been amended
by Cabinet to continue the obligation to supply with no expiry date. However
the obligation will be able to be met by either lines or by an alternative
method of supply. It is noted that the Commerce Commission will be required to
recognise this on-going obligation when exercising their powers.
Input methodologies for April 2009 price re-set
The Commerce Commission released
a Draft Process Paper on the Regulatory Principles & Guidelines in early
June 2008. Refer to the full article below under the Regulatory Policy section.
Requirement to facilitate connection of distributed generation
The Electricity
Governance (Connection of Distributed Generation) Regulations 2007 came into
force on 30 August 2007. For more information or just
to chat about how your company can comply, pick here.
Requirement to implement a public safety management system (PSMS)
The Electricity Amendment Act
2006 and the Gas Amendment Act 2006 both spell out the requirement for Safety
Management Systems. These Acts set out what any Regulations made under the
respective Acts must include and what it may include. If you
would like further information or simply to chat about how a PSMS might work
for you, pick here.
Proposed change to ODV disclosure date
The Commerce Commission does not
intend requiring electricity lines businesses to undertake a full ODV update as
at 31st March 2008, but proposes instead that this be deferred until
31st March 2009. Read
the full notice.
Price
controls
NZ – reasons for not declaring control of Vector
Introduction
In mid-December 2007 the Commerce Commission released its draft
decisions for not declaring control of Vector’s
electricity lines business. In late May 2008 the Commission released its
reasons for not declaring control, which forms the subject of this article.
Background
Readers will remember that
Vector’s breach of its price path threshold by 0.028% of notional revenue triggered
an inquiry. The conclusions of that inquiry led the Commission to announce its
intention to declare control of the lines business on 9 August 2006. Vector
subsequently submitted an administrative settlement offer that the Commission
believed was broadly consistent with the objectives of the targeted control
regime (this story is told in more detail in Pipes
& Wires #68 for those who are interested).
Key issues with declaring control
The Commission has noted in
previous instances that control is a costly and difficult approach to achieving
the objectives of the price path threshold, and that accepting a suitable
administrative settlement offer is better way to meet those objectives. In this
instance, the Commission also notes that it would be difficult to implement
control and achieve any useful benefits before the April 2009 re-set.
The Commission’s reasons for not declaring control
The Commission’s reasons for not
declaring control are…
·
Vector’s commitment to rebalance line charges will provide
allocative and dynamic efficiencies in a less intrusive and costly manner than
declaring control.
·
Vector’s commitment to comply with its price path threshold for
the remainder of the period will result in outcomes consistent with s57E(a) to
(c) at a lower administrative and compliance cost than control.
·
Vector is more likely to be incentivised to invest in supply
reliability under an administrative settlement than under control.
So hopefully this will be a happy
ending to what could’ve been a nasty story.
NZ – decisions not to declare control of lines businesses
Introduction
Early in June 2008 the Commerce
Commission released its decisions not to declare control of Alpine Energy,
Aurora Energy, Electricity Invercargill, MainPower, Nelson Electricity, Network
Tasman, Network Waitaki, Northpower, Orion, Powerco, ScanPower, Top Energy, The
Lines Company, Waipa Networks and WEL Networks in regard to threshold breaches
over the period 2003 to 2006. This lengthy article examines those decisions.
Background
The price path thresholds regime
made pursuant to Part 4A of the Commerce Act 1986 set out price and quality
thresholds that had to be complied with for assessment periods ending on 6
September 2003, 31 March 2004, 31 March 2005 and 31 March 2006. Each of the
above lines businesses was assessed as having breached one or more of these
thresholds.
Basis of the decisions
The following table summaries the
Commission’s reasons for not declaring control of each lines business, and in a
few cases also notes outstanding issues…
|
Business |
Issues that the Commission is not declaring control in regard to |
Issues that the Commission has reserved its
decision on |
|
Alpine Energy |
·
The 2004 and 2006 price threshold breaches are adequately
explained by the less-than-budgeted transmission charges. ·
The amount of the 2006 breach was returned to customers. ·
The 2004 quality threshold breach was predominantly explained by
an extreme event. ·
The 2006 quality threshold breach was only 1.8% and did not
merit further action. |
|
|
Aurora Energy |
·
The 2004 price threshold breach is fully explained by the less
than budgeted transmission costs. ·
Prices were reduced in accordance with the objective of the 2004
threshold. |
|
|
Electricity Invercargill |
·
The 2003 price threshold breach was predominantly explained by
an inability to pass on a transmission price increase. ·
This delay in passing on the transmission charge increase led to
the increase being absorbed by Electricity Invercargill rather than by
customers. ·
The 2004 price threshold breach was fully explained by the
difference between actual and budgeted pass-through costs. ·
By not increasing average prices during the 2004 assessment
period, Electricity Invercargill acted in accordance with the intention of
the thresholds. ·
Electricity Invercargill’s quality since the 2004 assessment
period does not represent a material deterioration in quality. |
|
|
MainPower |
·
The 2004 price threshold breach is fully explained by the
difference between actual and budgeted transmission costs. ·
By not increasing its average price during the 2004 assessment
period, MainPower acted in accordance with the intention of the thresholds. |
|
|
Nelson Electricity |
·
The 2003 price threshold breach was due to a delay in passing on
increased transmission charges. ·
This delay in passing on the transmission charge increase led to
the increase being absorbed by Nelson Electricity rather than by customers. |
·
The 2006 price threshold was breached by $182,000 which was due
to actual transmission charges being less than budgeted. ·
Nelson Electricity proposes to refund this amount to customers,
which the Commission has agreed to. ·
A final decision on declaring control will be made once the
amount has been refunded. |
|
Network Tasman |
·
The 2006 price threshold breach is predominantly explained by
the difference between actual and budgeted transmission costs. ·
The amount of the breach was returned to customers by way of
discounts. |
|
|
Network Waitaki |
·
The 2003 price threshold breach is fully explained by the
difference between actual and budgeted transmission costs. ·
By not increasing its average price during the 2003 assessment
period, Network Waitaki acted in accordance with the intention of the
thresholds. |
·
Network Waitaki breached its SAIDI and SAIFI thresholds during
the 2004, 2005 and 2006 assessment periods. ·
The Commission accepts that a high level of planned maintenance
has been performed. ·
The Commission will determine whether or not to declare control
once it is apparent that reliability has not materially declined. |
|
Northpower |
·
The 2006 price threshold breach was caused by an anomaly in
clause 5(1)(b) of the 2004 Notice. |
|
|
Orion |
·
The 2004 price threshold breach is fully explained by the
difference between actual and budgeted transmission costs. ·
By not increasing its average price during the 2004 assessment
period, Orion acted in accordance with the intention of the thresholds. ·
The 2005 price threshold breach was caused by an anomaly in
clause 5(1)(b) of the 2004 Notice. |
|
|
Powerco |
·
The 2004 price threshold breach is fully explained by the
difference between actual and budgeted transmission costs. ·
The 2004 quality threshold breach was significantly reduced when
the SAIDI and SAIFI were normalised. ·
The 2006 quality threshold breach was sufficiently minor to
merit no further action. ·
Powerco’s quality does not represent a material deterioration in
quality. |
|
|
ScanPower |
·
ScanPower’s quality trend does not indicate a material decline
with respect to the thresholds. |
·
ScanPower breached the 2005 price threshold by $34,200 due to
less than budgeted transmission charges. ·
The Commission accepts that ScanPower’s proposed price freeze
will effectively refund customers. ·
Once this refund has occurred the Commission will determine whether
to declare control. |
|
The Lines Company |
·
The 2003 price threshold breach was due to a delay in passing on
increased transmission costs. ·
This delay in passing on the transmission charge increase led to
the increase being absorbed by The Lines Company rather than by customers. |
|
|
Top Energy |
·
The 2003 price threshold breach was predominantly due to not
passing on increased transmission costs. ·
This delay in passing on the transmission charge increase led to
the increase being absorbed by Top Energy rather than by customers. ·
The 2004 price threshold breach was fully explained by the
difference between budgeted and actual pass-through costs. ·
The 2006 price threshold breach was predominantly explained by
the difference between budgeted and actual pass-through costs. ·
Top Energy returned the amount of its 2006 breach to its
customers. ·
Top Energy’s quality does not represent a material deterioration
in quality. |
|
|
Waipa Networks |
·
The 2003 price threshold breach was predominantly explained by a
failure to pass on increased transmission charges. ·
This delay in passing on the transmission charge increase led to
the increase being absorbed by Waipa Networks rather than by customers. ·
Waipa Networks quality since 2004 does not represent a material
deterioration in quality. |
|
|
WEL Networks |
·
The 2004 price threshold breach was explained by differences
between actual and budgeted transmission charges. ·
WEL Networks did not increase its line charges during the 2004
assessment period. |
|
Pipes & Wires will make
further comment as any further decisions are made public.
UK – re-opening the 4th electricity price control
Introduction
All network utility tariffs make
underlying assumptions about the level of costs to be recovered by the operator
during the control period. So when those underlying costs change during the
control period or when they are uncertain to start with, it is not unreasonable
to expect the original price control to be re-visited. This article examines
the re-opening of DPCR4 in regard to the costs of supply quality, street works
and traffic management to set some context for examining OFGEM’s final decisions.
Background
When OFGEM was consulting on
DPCR4 it was recognised that electricity distributors would face uncertainties
in regard to the following costs…
·
Regulations 17 and 18 of the Electricity Safety, Quality &
Continuity Regulations 2002 that deal with line clearances and tree cutting
requirements.
·
Any amendments to the above Regulations.
·
Secondary legislation on road occupation costs under the New Roads
& Street Works Act 1991.
·
Permit schemes introduced through secondary legislation under the
Traffic Management Act 2004.
When DPCR4 was being compiled,
OFGEM considered that including fixed allowances in DPCR4 once the magnitude of
cost impacts could be better assessed would incentivise distributors to manage
those costs more efficiently.
Legal framework for re-opening
The prevailing legal framework is
the Utilities Act 2000 which inter alia
requires an electricity distributor to hold a license granted by the Gas &
Electricity Markets Authority. Any license granted to an organisation that
meets specified criteria will include a range of Standard License Conditions
and Special License Conditions, and it is Special License Condition A3 that
provides for distributors to issue a notice to OFGEM stating that the
distributor wishes to re-open a price control. Condition A3 requires OFGEM to
respond within 4 months or, by default, the distributors proposed amendment is
made.
The re-opening process to date
OFGEM had previously written to
the distributors requesting information on the effects of the issues set out
above. The responses from the distributors have given OFGEM a basis to assess
the impact of those issues and assist consultation. OFGEM expects to publish
its final decisions at the end of October 2008, so Pipes & Wires will
hopefully make further comment in November.
NZ – Transpower administrative settlement accepted
Introduction
In mid-May 2008 the Commerce Commission released a two-part
document addressing the following issues…
·
Decisions & reasons for not declaring control of Transpower.
·
Decisions to re-set Transpower’s thresholds.
This article examines the first
of the above issues, noting that the decision to re-set Transpower’s thresholds
is an integral part of their Revised Settlement Offer.
Background
In October 2007 the Commission
released its draft decision for not declaring control of Transpower following a
post-breach inquiry and Transpower’s subsequent decision to submit an
administrative settlement offer. The basis of Transpower’s administrative
settlement offer was considerably more complex than the Unison and Vector settlements, which in part reflected
the different nature of a transmission business from a distribution business
(those who have closely followed Pipes & Wires analysis of the Australian
transmission grid tariff setting processes may have noted these issues). Pipes
& Wires #64 tells this story in detail for those who are interested.
Key reasons for accepting Transpower’s settlement
In making its draft decision not
to declare control, the Commission noted voluntary compliance with a settlement
agreement is more likely to achieve the stated outcomes of the price path threshold
regime at a lower compliance and administrative cost.
In making its final decision not
to declare control, the Commission concluded that its concerns could be
addressed by accepting Transpower’s Revised Settlement Offer and by re-setting
Transpower’s price path thresholds, whilst also avoiding the compliance and
administrative costs of control (which the Commission expected could include
more detailed scrutiny of both OpEx and CapEx).
This brings another potentially
sad story to a happier ending.
Mergers,
acquisitions & take-overs
NZ – shareholders approve Vector
sale
Pipes
& Wires has chronicled Vector’s sale of
its Wellington electricity networks, for which Cheung Kong
Infrastructure emerged as the successful
bidder. Late last week Vector’s shareholders approved the sale by an
overwhelming 99.83%.
The final
step is the approval of the Overseas Investment Office. Their decision is not expected for another few weeks yet.
Industry comment is that the OIO is unlikely to decline the application,
especially since the Wellington networks have already been foreign-owned twice
before.
Aus – BG’s bid for Origin comes
unstuck
Introduction
Pipes & Wires #71 briefly introduced BG Group’s unsolicited takeover bid for Australian gas utility Origin Energy to provide some context for later analysis, but it seems that
after two stern rebuffs from Origin that it’s all over. This article examines
BG’s offers, its strategy and why Origin’s directors recommended that
shareholders reject the offers.
BG’s offers
In late
April 2008 Origin Energy received an unsolicited A$14.70 per share cash bid
from BG Group for all Origin shares, valuing Origin’s equity at A$13.6b. After
taking expert advice on a range of underlying value matters, Origin engaged
with BG and negotiated an increased offer of A$15.50 per share. This engagement
process looked promising enough for Origin to request a trading halt prior to
the ASX opening on 30th May in anticipation of making an
announcement. However this was not to be.
BG’s strategy
On the
face of it, BG’s strategy as revealed by the Origin bid seemed a simple enough
expansion into a new market by acquisition. What was fairly promptly suggested
by the expected divestment of Origin’s 51% stake in Contact Energy and a focus on Origin’s gas reserves was that the BG bid was more
about backward integration to secure the UK’s gas supplies than a simple market
growth strategy.
Origin’s recommendation to reject
Right
from the start it was clear that any deal would have to be at a significant
premium to Origin’s trading price. Origin’s Chief Executive Grant King commented
early on in the game that while BG’s first bid of A$14.70 was at a significant
premium to Origin’s trading price, that premium still did not fairly reflect
the yet-to-be exposed value of Origin’s coal seam gas reserves. King went on to
comment that Origin was worth a lot more than A$15.50, and was subsequently
vindicated by Santos’ LNG deal
with Petronas that
suggested Origin’s coal seam gas business alone is worth at least A$16b.
So this
brings what was looking to be a long and exciting story to a short, but
nonetheless exciting, close.
Europe – interest in E.On’s
transmission business
Introduction
Back in
March 2008 news emerged that electricity giant E.On was considering selling its transmission grid subsidiary E.On Netz in return for the EU Competition Commission dropping a possibly damaging anti-trust investigation. This
article examines this issue now that several key events have played out.
Background
Readers
may recall from Pipes & Wires #68 that the EU Competition Commissioner had commenced an inquiry
back in 2005 to determine whether the benefits of energy sector reform were
emerging. The conclusion was that the benefits were not emerging and that insufficient
unbundling of energy and networks was partly to blame.
E.On’s
rather bold response to consider selling E.On Netz was controversial because it
broke ranks with the prevailing German nationalist, anti-Brussels feeling and
also because it could’ve forced other major grid operators such as EDF, RWE Transportnetz and EnBW to sell their grids at less than favorable terms.
E.On’s board approves sale
In May
2008 E.On’s board approved the sale of about 10,000km of transmission grid to
an operator that has neither grids nor generation (in an attempt to prevent its
competitor’s consolidating, and also to promote a unified German UHV grid), and
also confirmed that it is prepared to divest 4,800MW of generating capacity
within Germany. Assets swaps remain E.On’s preferred means of divestment.
Movements on the anti-trust front
The
commission will review E.On’s proposals and then seek comment from E.On’s
competitors (who may well wish to avoid being too harsh lest the tables be
turned), and then decide whether to accept E.On’s proposal’s and end the
matter. Given the possibility of fines amounting to several billion Euro’s E.On
will no doubt want to make their proposal as sweet as possible.
Interest in the transmission
business
Not
surprisingly, interested bidders are already poking their heads up…
·
UK’s National Grid is reported to be thinking over a €1b offer for the transmission
grid that could see it move beyond its core UK and US markets.
·
Macquarie European Infrastructure Funds indicated that it would be keen to examine the assets.
·
Private equity firm 3i in
conjunction with other similar firms.
·
Financial services group Allianz.
Undoubtedly
more interested parties will poke their heads up, and it will be interesting to
see whether they are mostly equity funds or utilities. Pipes & Wires will
revisit this once the Commission has concluded its analysis and consultation.
Europe – Suez sells its Distrigas
stake
Introduction
Pipes & Wires #65 noted that one of the proposed concessions of the GDF Suez merger was that Suez would sell its’ 57.25% stake in Belgian gas utility
Distrigas. This article examines the bidding for Distrigas and the eventual
successful offer by Italian utility Eni.
Background
Readers
may recall the French Government’s push to develop a national energy champion
by encouraging Suez and Gaz De France to merge. Like all big mergers, clearance needed to be sought
from the anti-trust regulators to ensure that the merged entity would not be
anti-competitive in one or more markets. The EU Competition Commission concluded that a merged GDF Suez would reduce competition inter alia in the Belgian gas markets,
and that one of the necessary conditions for approving the merger would be for
Suez to sell its stake in Distrigas (a further condition was that Suez
relinquish control of its stake in Belgian gas transmission operator Fluxys).
The bidder’s
All the
usual acquisitive utilities quickly emerged … E.On, RWE, EDF, ENEL, Iberdrola and Centrica … all of
which have well articulated strategies of consolidating their European energy
markets.
Early in
June 2008 Eni squeezed EDF and E.On out of the race and entered into an
exclusivity arrangement with Suez. Eni has made an all-cash deal that values
the Distrigas stake at about €2.7b and expects to then launch a bid for the
remaining 42.75% stake on the same terms and conditions.
Energy policy
NZ – revised Government Policy
Statement
Introduction
In
mid-May 2008 the Minister
of Energy signed off the latest GPS on Electricity. This article examines the key aspects of the revised GPS that
will be of most interest to electricity distributors and comments on those
aspects.
Key aspects of the revised GPS
Key
aspects of the revised GPS include…
·
Para 45 – transmission and distribution companies should have
incentives to manage losses and constraints. The Electricity
Commission should promote pricing
structures that provide appropriate signals.
·
Para 46 – efficient use of energy should be promoted by the Electricity
Commission through such means as cost-reflective pricing, smart metering and
demand-side management.
·
Para 48 – planning of the national grid needs to support
connection of renewable generation.
·
Para 52 – the need for security of supply objectives to be
supported by reliable transmission and distribution lines.
·
Para 83 – grid reliability should be maintained at a level
required by users.
·
Para 87 – connected grid users should be permitted some
flexibility over standards as long as the core grid is not compromised.
·
Para 108 – a requirement for Transpower’s transmission services to be priced as efficiently as possible.
·
Para 109 – a requirement for Transpower’s connection charges to be
based as far as possible on a user pays basis and include clear locational
signals.
·
Para 112 – an expectation that rural line charge increases will be
in step with changes to urban line charges.
·
Para 113 – the need for Use of System Agreements to keep pace with
industry developments.
·
Para 119 – an expectation that the Electricity Commission and the Commerce Commission will review their MOU by 30 November 2008 to specifically address
improving incentives for lines businesses to manage losses, improve uptake of
smart metering, ensure efficient pricing, ensure security levels are met,
facilitate energy efficiency, facilitate demand-side management and facilitate
distributed generation.
·
Para 121 – a requirement for the Electricity Commission to
investigate guidelines or standards for connecting domestic scale distributed
generation.
Implementing the GPS
The key
policy instrument is the Electricity Commission, however the GPS notes that
there are many other related matters such as climate change, emissions trading
and economic transformation that lie with other agencies but which the
Government expects the Commission to contribute to.
Regulatory policy
NZ – progress on the Commerce
Amendment Act
Introduction
Last time
we examined progress on the Commerce Amendment Bill it had just had its first
reading and was off to the Commerce Committee which was receiving submissions until the 9th May. This
article examines progress on the Bill since then.
Background
The Bill
proposes to rewrite the existing Parts 4 and 4A of the Commerce Act 1986 which
broadly sets out the price and quality regulatory framework for electricity
lines businesses. A key thrust of the Bill is to inter alia encourage investment in essential infrastructure.
Latest progress on the Bill
Submissions
on the Bill have closed, and the Committee expects to report back on 22nd
July. Pipes & Wires will make further comment after that date.
NZ – the input methodologies
Introduction
A key
feature of any regulatory regime is a robust set of input parameters that are also
(preferably) set independently from the body enforcing the regime. This article
examines the Commerce Commission’s proposed approach to developing what was referred to as an “input
methodologies” in the Commerce Amendment Bill that is expected to replace Part 4 and 4A of the existing
Commerce Act 1986.
Background
Readers
will no doubt be aware of industry rules such as the National Third Party
Gas Access Code, the National Electricity
Rules (both in Australia) and the Electricity Governance Rules in New Zealand. A key purpose of these rules is to provide
certainty of investment, and such rules may typically have two characteristics…
·
The rules are not made up by the body that will administer them
eg. the Gas Code is written by the National Competition Council with input from
individual state Ministers, but approving access arrangements under the Gas
Code is overseen by the ACCC (which
is now migrating this function to the AER) and by the ERA in
Western Australia.
·
The rules are made up before the game starts. This has been
especially important in jurisdictions that require utilities to submit draft
access arrangements to a regulator for approval (and the utility can have
confidence that if it has derived its access arrangement in accordance with the
rules, the regulator has to approve it).
Although
the Commission’s Regulatory Principles & Guidelines will not meet the first
criteria above (which is tolerable), it should go a long way to meeting the
second criteria.
Expected scope of the Regulatory
Principles & Guidelines
The
expected scope of the paper will include…
·
Cost of capital (drawing on previous work).
·
Asset valuation (including depreciation and revaluation).
·
Allocation of common costs between businesses, customer classes
and geographic areas.
·
Treatment of tax.
·
Regulatory specifications including the duration of the regulatory
period, excluded costs, re-set processes, and circumstances for reconsidering
terms & conditions during the regulatory period.
This will
apply to electricity distribution, electricity transmission, and controlled gas
transmission and distribution.
The Commission’s progress to date
and expected project plan
In early
June 2008 the Commission released a Draft Process Paper setting out the expected scope and timing of their work. The
Commission expects to use a three stage approach as follows…
·
Deriving a Statement of Principles.
·
Guidelines for each of the subject areas (identified above).
·
Methodologies specific to regulated electricity and gas sectors to
guide the application of the Guidelines.
The
Commission notes that this is all contingent on the passage of the Commerce
Amendment Bill, and also expects to consult widely on each of the three stages
(the first of which has already closed).
CapEx – general interest stuff
Getting the CapEx right in the infrastructure sectors
This presentation was made at the
NZIGE Spring Technical Seminar in
September 2007. If you’d like a copy, pick here.
Renewals – (half) the hidden side of CapEx
This presentation was made at the
Electricity Networks Asset Management Summit in November 2007 on the broad
topic of asset renewals. If you’d like a copy, pick here.
Upsizing – the other of the hidden side of CapEx
This presentation will be made at
the Electricity Engineer’s Conference on 20th June 2008 on the broad
topic of asset upsizing. Pick here
to order a copy.
PAS 55 – the emerging standard for asset management
To find out more about improving
your asset management activities through adopting the emerging global standard
for asset management PAS 55-1:2004 pick here
or call Phil on +64-7-8546541, or to request a Slide Show on implementing PAS
55-1 pick here.
Website promoting best practice CapEx
Utility
Consultants is pleased to announce the release of a specialist website
dedicated to promoting best practice CapEx policies, processes and planning in
the infrastructure sectors.
Assorted conference papers
Utility Consultants has recently
presented the following conference papers which are available upon request…
·
“Tariff
control of Pipes & Wires utilities – where is it heading??” – presented
at the NZIGE Spring Technical Seminar,
October 2006.
·
“Setting
service levels for utility networks” – presented at the Electricity Network
Asset Management Summit, November 2006.
Conferences & events
·
SCADA
& Process Control Summit (Auckland, 27th June 2008)
·
Complex
Infrastructure Project Management (Wellington, 22nd – 23rd
July 2008)
·
10th
Annual NZ Energy Summit (Wellington, 15th – 16th September
2008)
·
6th Annual NZ Gas Industry Summit (Wellington, 15th
– 16th September 2008)
·
NZIGE Spring Technical
Seminar (Rotorua, 15th – 16th September 2008)
·
Southern Africa
Energy Efficiency Convention (Gauteng, 6 – 7 November 2008).
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Disclaimer
These articles are of a general nature and
are not intended as specific legal, consulting or investment advice, and are
correct at the time of writing. In particular Pipes & Wires may make
forward looking or speculative statements, projections or estimates of such
matters as industry structural changes, merger outcomes or regulatory
determinations.
Utility Consultants Ltd accepts no liability
for action or inaction based on the contents of Pipes & Wires including any
loss, damage or exposure to offensive material from linking to any websites
contained herein.