From the editor’s
desk…
Welcome
to Pipes & Wires #124. This month we extend PW’s coverage to include rail
in both NZ and the UK. We also examine a range of policy and merger happenings
in the UK and Europe. We then move on to Africa, to examine government
intervention in a price control, and construction of an HVDC link. In Australia
we look at some proposed changes to regulatory policy, and plans to end retail
price regulation. Finally, we conclude by examining regulatory scrutiny of a
smart meter roll-out.
Matters for attention (NZ)
Distribution pricing review
The
Electricity Authority will be reviewing EDB’s pricing methodologies to inter
alia ensure that each EDB’s methodology aligns to the pricing principles and is
efficient. This work stream will involve an independent review of each EDB’s
methodology, after which the Authority will release its findings, probably
around August or September 2013.
The
Authority’s focus will be on whether distribution pricing is efficient and is
supporting competition. Pick here
or call Phil on (07) 854-6541 to discuss your requirements.
Gas asset management plans
The Commerce
Commission’s decisions NZCC 23 and NZCC
24 set out the requirements for gas distribution and gas transmission
businesses (collectively referred to as gas pipeline businesses, GPB’s) to
disclose an AMP that meets specified criteria. Pick here
or call Phil on (07) 854-6541 to discuss your requirements.
Information disclosure updates
The
Commerce Commission has recently posted further material on electricity
information disclosure. Pick here
or call Phil on (07) 854-6541 to discuss how your company might comply with
these requirements.
Topical issues for thought...
Civic
authorities have recently expressed increasing concern about how long the
electricity was off after significant natural events. As Pipes & Wires has
explored, there are many seemingly complex issues around this such as whether
smart grids would have improved restoration and what costs the regulatory
regime allowed and didn’t allow the electric companies to recover, however much
of it comes back to having a hard, resilient network. This includes features
such as stronger conductors in wind-prone areas, braced structures, lifting
underground assets above ground, better drainage in underground vaults, and
moving key assets away from flood-prone areas.
Network
hardening and resilience needs a clear strategy that recognises likely disaster
scenarios and includes engagement with regulators over the likely costs and
benefits. To discuss this in more detail, pick here
or call Phil on (07) 854-6541.
Cool video clips
The reshaping of British Railways
Transforming
high fixed-cost infrastructure businesses like railways from social services to
profitable entities is always a challenge. This 20 minute video clip of Dr Richard
Beeching presenting the modernisation plan for British Rail in 1963 raises some
issues that are still pertinent.
Building the Hoover Dam
Most
of us probably have a fascination with hydro-electric dams. This 27 minute video clip shows the huge
scale of the Hoover Dam, and proved to be a really good “dad & son” video.
New Zealand
NZ – light rail for Wellington ?
Introduction
Light
rail options for Wellington featured in the news in June 2013. In a slight
departure from Pipes & Wires focus on pipes & wires we have a bit of a
look at the likely benefits and costs of light rail in comparison to other
options.
The WPTS Study
This
whole “thing” goes by the grand name of the Wellington Public Transport Spine
(WPTS) which is a key action from the Ngauranga – Airport Corridor Plan. The WPTS
Study considers the specific transport route from the Railway Station to
Kilbernie (a route many of us undoubtedly know, albeit from the comfort of a
taxi), and has shortlisted 3 options.
The options and the likely costs
The
3 shortlisted options are as follows....
|
Option |
Likely
benefits |
Likely costs |
Benefit to
cost ratio |
|
|
Capital |
Operating |
|||
|
Bus priority, which will use standard buses. Key features will be peak
period bus lanes in congested areas, and priority at traffic lights. |
By
2031, this option is expected to cut 3 minutes off the morning peak commute,
with user benefits equating to $35m. |
$59m |
$88m per year |
0.57 – 0.67 |
|
Bus rapid transit, which will use new high capacity, high quality buses.
Key features will be dedicated bus lanes with priority traffic lights. |
By
2031, this option is expected to cut 6 minutes off the morning commute from
Newtown and 11 minutes from Kilbernie, giving user benefits of $95m. |
$207m |
$83m per year |
0.87 – 1.55 |
|
Light rail, which will use trams in dedicated lanes with priority
traffic lights. |
By
2031, this option is expected to cut 7 minutes off the morning commute from
Newtown and 11 minutes from Kilbernie, giving user benefits of $56m. |
$940m |
$89m per year |
0.05- 0.1 |
This
analysis obviously needs to be considered in light of the overall Ngaraunga –
Airport Corridor Plan, but it would seem that the bus rapid transit option is the
best, and certainly heaps better than the light rail. Are the people of
Wellington willing to pay an extra $730m to maybe cut 1 minute off the Newtown
commute ? My guess is probably not.
Some wider musings
A
few wider thoughts include...
·
An old Chinese proverb says “the best
time to plant a tree is 20 years ago ... the next best time to plant a tree is
today”. I think the same might well apply to light rail.
·
Consider the “hundred year test” ... in
100 years how will citizens, ratepayers and infrastructure customers view our
fixed asset investment decisions ? Urban legend has it that in the 1950’s the
Hamilton City Council (and I will stand corrected on this if need be) ran out
of money to buy the land between the Tramway Rd – East St corner (where the
Eastside Church now stands) and Ruakura Rd, so until the new motorway was
opened a few months ago, traffic has had to take a slow and tortuous route
through the Peachgrove Rd traffic. Also consider the decision to tear up the
tram tracks in most NZ cities in the 1950’s.
·
Urban development seems to get more
intensive over time, making less room for transport corridors and either
forcing them underground at great cost or requiring houses to be demolished.
·
The need to decouple major, long-life
infrastructure projects from short-term political cycles. During my many taxi
rides around Melbourne I’ve often pondered why major infrastructure and in
particular major transport projects seem to work so much better in Victoria
than it does in NSW or NZ. The conclusion I reached was that the Victorian
government has placed its major infrastructure into state-owned corporations
with appointed commercial directors, thereby removing the political dimension
from the problem. I’d be interested in hearing from anybody who can
substantiate a different conclusion.
·
Infrastructure costs seem to be increasing
rapidly. A couple of years ago I was reading an AA Directions magazine whilst
waiting for a steak dinner in a small cafe at the top of the South Island.
There was a very instructive article on why roading projects seem to cost so
much more in NZ, and it included some robust and comprehensive international
cost comparisons that considered all manner of factors such as labor indices
and foreign exchange. The article concluded that NZ roading projects are so
much more expensive because of the concessions made to single-interest groups,
in part because the legislative framework gives these groups a huge amount of
say.
So
we’ll leave this issue with those thoughts, and check back in a few months to
see what conclusions have been reached.
UK and
Europe
UK – Severn Trent Water declines
takeover offer
Introduction
Fund
managers are taking an increasing liking to regulated infrastructure businesses
because of the reasonably predictable cash yields once the revenue
determinations are finalised. This article examines a recently abandoned bid
for UK water & sewage company Severn
Trent plc.
Severn Trent’s business
Severn
Trent is one of largest water & sewage companies in the UK, supplying about
3,700,000 customers in the west Midlands and eastern Wales areas. Annual
revenues are about £1.7b, and after-tax profits are about £265m.
The bid
A
consortium of Borealis Infrastructure
Management and LongRiver Group has recently made several offers for Severn
Trent, culminating in an offer of £22 per share, representing a premium of
about 22% over Severn Trent’s recent share price and valuing Severn Trent at about
£5.3b. Severn Trent promptly rejected this final bid as “too low”.
The rise of Canadian funds
A
few years ago the interest of pension and sovereign wealth funds in regulated
pipes & wires business emerged. That pattern now seems to be well established,
with the Canadian pension funds such as Borealis, the Canadian Pension
Plan and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan
featuring regularly. A quick look at some historical ForEx data indicates that
the C$ has strengthened about 20% against the US$ over the last 4 years,
suggesting a strong reason for that interest.
Norway – excluding private ownership of
transmission
Introduction
Interconnection
of electric (and indeed gas) transmission often comes hand-in-hand with “market
features” such as private capital and exclusion from regulatory regimes. This
article examines the emerging regulatory framework in Norway that would
prohibit private owners from taking a majority stake in cross-border electric
grids.
The proposed Northconnect Cable
Northconnect is a consortium of Agder Energi, E-CO, Lyse, Scottish
& Southern Energy, and Vattenfall.
The group is planning to build and operate a 1,400MW, 570km HVDC link from
Norway to Scotland, and hopes to have the cable operative by 2020.
The Norwegian government’s plans
In
June 2013 the Norwegian Parliament ruled that its own Statnett would have either exclusive or
majority control of all electricity transmission grids crossing the Norwegian
border, effectively gazzumping Northconnect. Northconnect’s partners believe
that this ruling may breach the European Free Trade Association rules and are
considering an appeal to the EU.
Mixed signals from the government ??
The
Norwegian government’s move seems simple and yet at the same time awkward, so
let’s try to step thru’ the issues and understand them a bit better...
·
Understandably the government would
like its own grid company Statnett to lead the way and have the most prominent
position in the electricity industry. Sounds a bit like the various attempts to
form national energy champions a few years ago (remembering that Germany
succeeded very well with the E.On – Ruhrgas
merger, France kind of succeeded with the GDF-Suez
merger, and Spain failed miserably).
·
The government would presumably also
like the revenues to be captured by Statnett. There is of course the small
matter that Statnett would need to stump up at least 51% of the estimated
£1.75b.
·
Northconnect’s tag line is “connecting
renewables”. Presumably this is no longer an over-arching goal for the
Norwegian government, or perhaps it is subservient to the desire for only
Statnett to connect renewables.
·
At a guess, the Norwegian government
would be trying to attract investment and jobs (there’s 1,100km of cable for a
start), however this ruling sends a very mixed message about just how welcome
private capital really is.
Pipes
& Wires will examine Northconnect as the story unfolds.
UK – the Draft Determination for
Network Rail
Introduction
Almost
2 years ago Pipes
& Wires #103 examined the framework for the next railway track access
charges that the Office of Rail
Regulation (ORR) proposed in its PR13
paper. This article examines the ORR’s CP5 Draft Determination, which will
apply to Network Rail for the 5 year regulatory period starting on 1st
April 2014.
Re-capping the key features of PR13
A
couple of key features of PR13 included...
·
An
expectation that the industry will improve its efficiency by about 30% by
2018/19 (compared to the 2008/09 baseline).
·
The
use of a building block model, similar to most other regulated infrastructure.
·
Determination
of efficient expenditure at a route level (rather than at a business-wide
level).
Key features of the CP5 Draft Determination
The
ORR released its CP5 Draft
Determination in June 2013, and it is a rather lengthy document running to
815 pages (which I guess must be up there with the most voluminous of them
all). Similar to many other regulatory decisions, a “propose-respond” approach
has been used. Key features of the Draft Determination include (with
comparisons to Network Rail’s Strategic Business Plan that was submitted to the
ORR in early 2013)....
|
Description |
Strategic
Business Plan |
Draft
Determination |
Final Determination |
|
Total
spend |
£40.095b |
£37.869b |
|
|
Total
spend excluding enhancements |
£27,706b |
£25,630b |
|
|
Support,
O&M, renewals |
£23,293b |
£21,385b |
|
|
Major
project spend |
£12,388b |
£11,600b |
|
|
Nett
revenue requirement |
£29,227b |
£27,428b |
|
|
Nett
debt to RAB |
68.8% |
68.2% |
|
|
Core
support efficiency gains |
12.3% |
20% |
|
|
Renewal
efficiency gains |
15.7% |
20.1% |
|
Next steps
At
the time of writing this article, the ORR is receiving submissions on the Draft
Determination until 4th September 2013. The Final Determination is
expected at the end of October 2013.
UK – extending the loan guarantee for
Hinkley Point C
Introduction
One
by one the proposals for Britain’s new nuclear stations fell off the table,
until only a few remain. Not surprisingly, the sticky point is certainty of
investment. This article examines the loan guarantee extended to EDF Energy by the UK government.
The proposed Hinkley Point C station
The
C station is planned around 2 Areva 1,600MW European Pressurised
Reactors (EPR’s), and will be adjacent to the now disused A
and B
stations at Hinkley Point on the Somerset coast (looking towards south Wales).
The C station is expected to cost about £14b.
The
EPR is a third generation Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) that was developed by
Areva, EDF and Siemens.
The Contracts for Differences
Much
of the back-room negotiation is around the strike price for the Contracts for
Differences (CfD’s), which is the amount that the holder of the CfD gets paid
by the counter party (in this case, the UK government who wish to promote
investment by guaranteeing a minimum price for the electricity generated). The
strike prices for renewables have been finalised at between an initial £100 per
MWh for on-shore wind to £305 per MWh for tidal and wave. These prices will
ramp down gradually by 2019, but will also be linked to inflation for their 15
year duration.
The loan guarantee extension
In
addition to the CfD, the UK government has also announced a £10b guarantee for
the C station, to assist EDF’s efforts to obtain commercial funding. Treasury
officials insist that it is a commercial loan, and not a subsidy but it would
appear that the taxpayer will pick up the tab if the C station proves unviable.
Some wider thoughts on loans, subsidies
and guarantees
Understandably
those opposed to nuclear power are decrying the loan as a subsidy, however there
seem to be several inconsistencies which are worth noting....
·
One of the founding principles of the
European Union is “no subsidies”. And yet the renewables industry is founded on
subsidies (most of which are being rapidly ramped down as part of austerity
measures).
·
Regulators have seemed determined to
ignore the principle of investment certainty for convention generation and for
networks, and yet have quickly recognised the need for renewables to have such
certainty.
·
In principle, how is subsidy by loan
guarantee any different from a subsidy by feed-in tariff or by CfD. After all
most taxpayers are also electricity consumers.
It’s
certainly worth another thought....
Africa
Swaziland – over-riding the electricity
tariff decision
Introduction
Government
intervention in the supposedly independent process of setting electricity
tariffs seems to be a recurring theme in Africa. This article examines the
recent government decision to further reduce electricity tariffs in Swaziland.
The tariff decision
In
December 2012 the Swaziland Electricity Company
(SEC) submitted a proposed tariff increase of 36.5% for the 2013/14 year to the
Swaziland Energy
Regulatory Authority (SERA) for approval. Key features of the SERA’s
decision for the 2013/14 year include...
·
An increase of 9.3%.
·
A revenue requirement of E1,189,333,955
(about US$120m).
·
A return on assets of E67,049,392
(about US$6.8m).
·
Fixed charges are allowed to increase
at 6.3%, the rate of inflation.
The government’s intervention
The
government subsequently intervened and reduced the allowable tariff increase to
5%. This is less than the price increase from SEC’s principal bulk electricity
supplier, Eskom.
Thinking about the issues
So
what are some of the issues ? A few issues spring to mind (and some will be
similar to the issues described in Kenya in Pipes
& wires #123)....
·
The SEC has already publically stated
that it will have to reduce investment levels, and that supply reliability will
inevitably decline. Already economists are warning that unreliable electricity
supply will reduce Swaziland’s attractiveness for investment.
·
Admittedly the government needs to
balance a wider range of issues (including maintaining civil order) than the
SERA does, but this strikes right to the heart of the regulatory independence
and investment certainty. Either the economic regulator is independent or its
not !!!
·
The cost of bulk electricity is
apparently not a pass-through cost, which seems unusual.
That’s
a good place to leave this specific issue, but the trend of ad-hoc government
intervention is certainly worrying.
Ethiopia & Kenya – the Eastern
Electricity Highway
Introduction
Construction
of an HVDC
link between Ethiopia and Kenya is expected to commence in September 2013
now that the African Development Bank has confirmed its contribution to the
project. This article examines the technical details of the link and its
funding.
The EEH objectives
The
EEH’s principal objectives are...
·
Increase the supply of electricity to
Kenya, whilst reducing its costs.
·
Provide additional revenue to Ethiopia,
by exporting electricity to Kenya.
Technical details of the EEH
Key
technical features of the EEH include....
·
1,066km of 500kV overhead line (the
precise line length differs between reports, but no matter what, it is a very
long line). Of the total length, about 437km will be within Ethiopia and 631km
within Kenya.
·
A convertor station at Wolayta-Sodo in Ethiopia to
interconnect with EEPCO’s 400kV grid.
·
A convertor station at Suswa in Kenya to interconnect
with KETRACO’s 400kV grid.
·
A 200MVAr synchronous condenser at
KETRACO’s new Longonot 400kV substation in Kenya.
Paying for the EEH
Funding
for the US$1.26b EEH will be as follows....
·
African development Bank – US$338m.
·
World Bank – US$684m.
·
French Development Agency – US$118m.
·
Kenyan government – US$88m
·
Ethiopian government – US$32m.
This
is obviously a major project, so Pipes & Wires will check back later in
2013 to see how construction has started.
Australia
Aus – changes to the Merits Review
process
Introduction
Most
regulatory regimes provide for at least some appeals to a Regulator’s final
decision, either on the basis of substance or of process. This article examines
a major change to the Merits Review processes embodied in the National Gas Law
and the National Electricity Law.
Legal framework for Merits Reviews
The
legal framework for Merits Reviews is as follows...
·
Chapter 8, Part 5, Division 2 of the National
Gas Law, in particular clause 246.
·
Part 6, Division 3A of the National
Electricity Law, in particular clause 71c.
These
clauses provide for a regulated electric or gas company to appeal the Australian Energy Regulator’s decision on 1
or more of the following grounds...
·
The original decision included an error
of fact in its findings, and that error was material to the original
decision.
·
The original decision included more
than 1 error of fact in its findings, and those errors in combination
were material.
·
The original decision maker’s exercise
of discretion was incorrect, having regard to all the circumstances.
·
The original decision maker’s decision
was unreasonable, having regard to all the circumstances.
Changes to the Merits Review process
The Standing Council on Energy and Resources
(SCER) has announced reforms that will require an applicant to also establish that
there is a prima facie case that
correcting the error will result in a “materially preferable” outcome for the
long-term interests of consumers. Whilst the long-term interests of consumers
is a fundamental principle of the NEL and the NGL, this latest move effectively
creates an additional hoop to be jumped through that may discourage
applications for Merits Reviews in which it would be difficult to demonstrate
that correcting the error will result in a “materially preferable” outcome.
Queensland – ending electricity retail
price control
Introduction
Pipes
& Wires #118 examined the full deregulation of South Australia’s retail
electricity markets. This article examines the Queensland government’s recently
announced plans to introduce competition into the south-east domestic market.
The proposal
It
is proposed to remove electricity price regulation in the south-east Queensland
(Energex distribution area)
electricity market from 1st July 2015, and allow competition albeit
with price monitoring by the Queensland
Competition Authority (QCA). The QCA will continue to set retail prices in the
Ergon distribution area until the
government strategy for introducing competition into the Ergon area is
finalised.
What might we see ?
In
broad terms we may see 2 things happen....
·
A reduction in prices, both by the
incumbent retailer to retain market share and by new entrants to build market
share.
·
A flurry of retailer switching that is
likely to depend on the various prices offered to each class of customer, but
may also include an “up yours” component in which customers switch because they
finally can.
So
... another 2 years and we’ll see how it pans out.
Aus – rethinking electricity network
regulation
Introduction
Pipes
& Wires #116 examined the Productivity
Commission’s enquiry into aspects of national electricity regulation, and
noted its draft conclusions. This article examines the Commission’s final
conclusions.
Key findings of the final report
Key
findings of the final report are as follows (with comparisons to the draft
report). Interested parties should read the full
report before forming a firm view.
|
Findings of draft report |
Findings of final report |
|
Electricity prices have risen by more
than 50% in real terms over the last 5 years, with transmission and
distribution costs being the main contributors. |
Average electricity prices have risen by
70% in real terms from June 2007 to December 2012. Spiraling network costs in
most states are the main contributor to these increases, partly driven by
inefficiencies in the industry and flaws in the regulatory environment. |
|
The over-arching regulatory objective of
the long-term interests of consumers has been lost. |
There
remains a need for further significant policy changes ... to produce better
outcomes for consumers. This includes modified reliability requirements,
improved demand management, more efficient planning of large transmission
investments, and changes to state regulatory arrangements and network
business ownership. |
|
Resolving interconnection issues between
state transmission grids would need to be part of a wider reform package to
deliver real benefits. |
Iinterconnectors
are sometimes under utilised because of perverse incentives and design flaws
created by the regulatory regime. Changes to the NER should address these
problems. |
|
About 25% of a retail electric bill is
required to supply about 40 hours of critical peak demand each year.
Something like $11b of capacity is only used for about 100 hours per year. |
Avoiding
this requires a phased and coordinated suite of reforms including customer
consultation, removal of retail price regulation, and staged introduction of
smart meters accompanied by time-based pricing for critical peak periods. |
|
Some consumers are being forced to pay
for more reliability than they want. |
Reliability
decisions should be based on trading off the costs of achieving them against
what customers are willing to pay, rather than by prescriptive (sometimes
politically influenced) standards. |
|
State-owned electric companies have
conflicting objectives, and also appear less efficient than privatised
companies. |
State-owned
network businesses have conflicting objectives which reduce their efficiency
and undermine the effectiveness of incentive regulation. Their
privately-owned counterparts are better at efficiently meeting the long-term
interests of their consumers. State-owned network businesses should be
privatised. |
|
The AER needs more resourcing, expertise,
accountability and accountability. |
The AER
should be given more control over its budget and resources, and be made more
accountable for how it manages those resources. Concerns about resourcing,
capability and accountability should largely be addressed by additional
funding announced by the government in late 2012, and by the agreement for
governance changes to the AER. |
|
The existing incentive regulation
encourages regulated electric companies to build too much. |
The
NER led to inflated costs of capital and created incentives for inefficient
investment. Incentive
arrangements intended to address the wider efficiency gains of demand
management in other parts of the energy supply chain would need to be
strengthened. |
|
Many of the inefficiencies that might be
blamed on the electric companies are simply responses to regulatory
incentives and structures that impede efficiency. |
It is important not to blame network
businesses for the current inefficiencies. Mostly they are responding to
regulatory incentives and structures that impeded their efficiency. |
So
.... a lot in the final report. I think we can expect substantial regulatory
change for a start. Pipes & Wires will make further comments as issues
arise.
North America
US – questioning the smart meter roll
out in Maine
Introduction
Disputes
over the real benefits of smart meters and exactly whether those benefits have
been delivered seems to be a never-ending issue. This article examines Central Maine Power’s (CMP) smart meter
roll-out which has been sharply criticised by the Maine Public Utilities Commission.
CMP’s smart meter program
CMP
sought approval in 2009 to install 615,000 smart meters at a cost of about
$200m (of which about ½ was funded by a federal stimulus grant). The estimated
benefit to CMP’s electric customers was $25m over 20 years.
The PUC’s allegations
The
PUC are alleging that far from saving $25m the smart meter program will
actually cost customers an extra $80m, apparently because customers are not
using the available information or shifting demand to off-peak. Apparently
those off-peak rates are there for customers to choose, so it’s hard to see why
those benefits not eventuating is CMP’s fault.
In
June 2013, the PUC voted to audit CMP’s smart meter program. CMP responded by
noting that by the end of 2013 its smart meter program will have been subject
to 13 audits including by the federal government, and that none of the 10
audits since 2010 have revealed any concerns with costs, program management or
system functionality. This audit is expected to be completed by the end of 2013,
so Pipes & Wires will check back then.
General stuff
Consulting services that may be of
interest to clients
Utility
Consultants wide expertise extends well beyond the above projects ... if you
need energy network advice chances are Utility Consultants has done work in
that area. Here’s a sample of work done for clients over the last few years
that demonstrate the breadth of skills, insight and experience that is
available....
·
Advised an electricity business on the
regulatory implications of bringing externally contracted field services back
in-house.
·
Identified economic and regulatory
arguments to support inclusion of transmission interconnection charge risk into
network tariffs.
·
Advised lines businesses on a
regulator’s proposed treatment of CapEx and OpEx.
·
Advised an international investor on
gas distribution policy and regulatory trends.
·
Identified national energy policy
implications for lines businesses.
·
Assisted a lines business to identify
the burden of proof implied by regulatory determinations.
·
Suggested amendments to a gas
transmission AMP to strengthen the economic arguments.
·
Identified electricity network
investment characteristics as part of an acquisition study.
·
Developed an AM framework for a gas
distribution business to link AM to regulatory requirements.
·
Identified OpEx – CapEx tradeoffs for an electricity lines
business.
·
Performed various substation growth and
reinforcement assessments.
·
Performed network physical and business
risk studies.
·
Compiled disaster recovery and business
continuity plans.
Pick
here
to download a profile of recent projects, or here
to contact Phil.
Guide to NZ electricity laws
I’ve
compiled a “wall chart” setting out the relationship between various past and
present electricity Acts, Regulations, Codes etc in sort of a chronological progression.
To request your free copy, pick here.
A bit of light-hearted humor
What
if price control had been around in the 1920’s and 1930’s ? A collection of
photo’s with humorous captions looks at some of the salient features of price
control. Pick here
to download.
Conferences & training courses
The following
conferences and training courses are planned...
· ACCC / AER
Regulatory Conference – Brisbane, 25th – 26th July
2013.
· Fundamentals
of the NZ electricity industry – Auckland, 2nd – 3rd
September 2013.
· Fundamentals
of the NZ electricity industry – Wellington, 16th – 17th
September 2013.
· CIGRE
International Symposium – Auckland, 16th – 17th
September 2013.
· Nuclear
Long Term Ops & Aging Management – Brussels, 24th – 25th
September 2013.
· Africa and Middle East Oil and
Gas Summit – Abu Dhabi, 30th September – 1st October
2013.
· Regulation
of Electricity Networks – London, 23rd – 24th October
2013.
· Regulation
of Electricity Networks – Cape Town, 28th – 29th
October 2013.
· Regulation
of Electricity Networks – Singapore, 4th – 5th
November 2013.
Utility
Consultants takes no responsibility for the content of individual courses or
conferences, nor for any administrative or travel arrangements.
Wanted – old electricity history books
If
anyone has an old copy of the following books (or any similar books) they no
longer want I’d be happy to give them a good home…
·
Wonders Of World Engineering
(published 1937) – in particular editions 1 to 27.
·
Distribution Of Electricity (WT Henley,
the cable manufacturer)
·
White Diamonds North.
·
Northwards March The Pylons.
·
Two Per Mile.
·
Live Lines (the old ESAA journal).
·
The Engineering History Of Electric
Supply In New Zealand.
Opt out from Pipes & Wires
Pick
this link
to opt out from Pipes & Wires. Please ensure that you send from the email
address we send Pipes & Wires to.
Disclaimer
These articles
are of a general nature and are not intended as specific legal, consulting or
investment advice, and are correct at the time of writing. In particular Pipes
& Wires may make forward looking or speculative statements, projections or
estimates of such matters as industry structural changes, merger outcomes or
regulatory determinations. These articles also summarise lengthy
documents, and it is important that readers refer to those documents in forming
opinions or taking action.
Utility
Consultants Ltd accepts no liability for action or inaction based on the
contents of Pipes & Wires including any loss, damage or exposure to
offensive material from linking to any websites contained herein, or from any
republishing by a third-party whether authorised or not, nor
from any comments posted on Linked In, Face Book or similar by other parties.